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ABSTRACT

There has been a dramatic consolidation process in the U.S. banking industry. Most related
literatures are reduced form analyze. There are very few structural model literatures in this field,
and the study focus is on branch level analysis, for example branch networks, or consumer’s
discrete choice model on local banks. However, the consolidation process, which is driven by
both bank exit and bank merger, happens at the firm level. My dissertation attempts to examine
the banking industry dynamics. Specifically, I estimate the underlying real exit primitive for the
industry to characterize the current industry structure observed in the data in the first chapter. As
the banking industry is highly regulated in almost all countries, I examine a series of regulation
environments using Monte Carlo experiments to quantify the effects of regulation changes on the
corresponding stay rate and producer surplus in the U.S. banking industry in chapter two based
on the structural model recovered in the previous chapter. Chapter three examines the

characteristics that affect the bank stay and different exit decisions using Extended Cox Model
with time-dependent covariates. By separating all merger types to construct a full set of
competing risks, we can at least provide more event-specific estimates comparing to categorizing
all mergers as a lump sum risk set.
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Introduction
1.1 Introduction
There has been a dramatic consolidation process in the U.S. banking industry. Most related
literatures are reduced form analyze. There are very few structural model literatures in this field,
and the study focus is on branch level analysis, for example branch networks, or consumer’s
discrete choice model on local banks. However, the consolidation process, which is driven by
both bank exit and bank merger, happens on firm level. My dissertation attempts to examine the
banking industry dynamics. Specifically, I estimate the underlying real exit primitive for the
industry to characterize the current industry structure observed in the data in the first chapter. As
the banking industry is highly regulated in almost all countries, I conduct a series of regulation
environments using Monte Carlo experiments to quantify the effects of regulation changes on the
corresponding stay rate and producer surplus in the U.S. banking industry in chapter two based
on the structural model recovered in the previous chapter. Chapter three examines the
characteristics that affect the bank stay and different exit decisions using Extended Cox Model
with time-dependent covariates. By separating all merger types to construct a full set of
competing risks, we can at least provide estimates that are more specific.

1

1.2 Chapter One: A Dynamic Structural Model for the U.S. Banking
Industry
There has been a dramatic consolidation in the U.S. banking industry. The number of
institutions continues to decrease, which is driven by both bank exit and bank merger. In this
paper, I estimate the underlying real exit primitive for the industry to characterize the current
industry structure observed in the data. I specify and estimate a dynamic structural model of the
banking industry evolution following a method proposed by Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007)
and the oblivious equilibrium concept by Weintraub, Benkard and Van Roy (2008). Loans count
for 60% of total assets. Thus, banks are modeled to operate in loan markets to maximize net
interest income from loans, and earn net noninterest income from many other on-and-off-balance
sheet activities. The sum of net interest income and net noninterest income after corporate tax
payments is treated as per period profit. If a bank exits, the scrap value is a portion of equity,
which is estimated. Within the model, rational forward-looking agents will compare the value of
continuation and the scrap value. All previous literature in a structural setting focuses on the
network or branch level of the banking industry. I estimate a model of the firm level using a rich
data set from the Consolidated Report of Condition and Income from 2000 to 2010. Per period
profit parameters, law of motions for state variables’ transitions, and real exit policy function are
estimated in the first stage, dynamic scrap parameters are estimated by simulated minimum
distance, which is applied by adding a disturbance to the recovered real exit policy function and
optimizing over the minimum violation condition.

2

1.3

Chapter Two: Monte Carlo Experiments of Consolidation and Welfare

Impact
Banks in all countries are highly regulated. Chapter Two quantifies the effects of policy
changes on the corresponding stay rate and producer surplus in the U.S. banking industry using
the estimated structural parameter from Chapter One. I design the following experiments:
increase the scrap parameter in order to capture an increase in the level of bank regulation; limit
the size of loan portfolio in order to capture more active intervention of regulator in bank
portfolio risk; apply the same shocks to segments of the industry: top 1-10 banks and 51-60
banks respectively, in order to quantify the effect of shocks on different banks to the whole
industry; control the interest rate to consider another possible alternative for regulation. The
simulation results indicate that as the scrap parameter becomes sharper, the stay rate in the
banking industry will decrease and the producer surplus will increase corresponding to a more
concentrated market. Negative shocks on the top banks are more significant for the whole
industry in both scale and sensitivity. Finally, a 10% increase (decrease) on the earning spread
ratio between the loan rate and the deposit rate is equivalent to a 2.2% decrease (a 2.8% increase)
on the corporation tax rate.

1.4

Chapter Three: Identify Consolidation in Banking: Separating the Role

of Exits and Mergers
Chapter Three uses a reduced form survival analysis to identify bank-level factors that affect
the stay and different exit decisions. The model first uses acquisition and failed or closed bank
3

exit as two possible actions in the choice set to compare with formal reference papers’ results,
then I extend the choice set to be a full set of possible actions by breaking down different
acquisitions to derive more specific estimates.
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Chapter One
A Dynamic Structural Model for the U.S. Banking
Industry

2.1 Introduction
In the U.S. banking industry, we have observed a dramatic consolidation process. Formal
research on the fundamental causes of consolidation usually concludes that there is no single
reason for consolidation. Possible causes include technology innovation, financial globalization
process, and deregulation. 1 Financial globalization not only enables larger banks to establish
foreign offices, but also comes with technology improvements. Electronic funds transfer has
greatly reduced transaction times. Introduction of ATM and internet banking reduces operational
costs. All of these improvements put inefficient banks up in an even less competitive positions.
The most important deregulation act in the U.S. banking industry is Riegle-Neal Interstate
Banking and Branching Efficiency Act, which repeals the interstate banking constraint.
Permissible banking activities were relaxed dramatically after that. Innovations are introduced in
more complicated macroeconomic environments. For example, financial derivatives have been
introduced to protect producers from possible sharp price changes on raw materials. The
updating and learning processes during innovations put more requirements on skilled employees,
which is also a problem for some small banks.
Consolidation can occur through exit by merger, or exit by failure or closure. In this paper, I
study the exit by failure or closure problem. It is an important and direct source for the banking
1

See Berger, Kashyap and Scalise (1995); Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999); Shull and Hanweck (2001).
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industry evolution-we observe the number of bank keeps decreasing, there were 8778
commercial banks in 2000, and 6898 commercial banks in 2010. The banking industry is highly
regulated in all perspectives of normal operation, capital structure, exit, and entry decisions. Exit
actions are combinations of firm decision in part based on regulatory burdens, which might
increase in the financial distress, and the regulator’s decision to close the institution. Regardless,
both the firm and regulator’s decision are influenced by the financial health, capital position, and
industry environment. Industry evolution and corresponding producer surplus highly depend on
exit decision underlying primitive applied in the industry.
In this paper, we are interested in what is the underlying model that generates the current
banking industry structure. Our strategy to answer this question proceeds in two steps. First, we
pose a theoretical model of the banking industry. Bank makes optimal decisions over providing
loans for profit given its own state, the industry structure, and facing a variable penalty cost on
capital structure. Decision makers make optimal exit decisions. Second, using a unique micro
panel data reported by each bank to the FDIC, named Consolidated Report of Condition and
Income (CALL), we recover parameters, which are consistent with the underlying model.
Among structural models in the banking industry, Ackerberg and Gowrisankaran (2006)
analyzed banks’ adoptions of the automated clearinghouse electronic payment system. They
separated banks into mutually exclusive networks, and limited the sample to banks in small
markets (national banks are excluded). Aguirregabiria, Clark, and Wang (2012) also introduced a
network model, which focused on bank expansion after the Riegle-Neal Act. Dick (2002) and
Zhou (2007) both introduced a market level analysis, by matching the observed bank market
share to the simulated bank market share in the model. With assumption of Type I extreme value
distribution on unobserved error term, these papers have a closed form solution for the market
6

share. So existing structural models either focus on bank expansion or market level analysis. My
paper is the first one to build a structural model to analyze banking industry consolidation, driven
by bank exit, at the firm level.
The backbone of this paper builds on a fully dynamic model introduced by Ericson and Pakes
(1995). Existing papers that apply this model share a common feature: there is a stochastic
process determining the firms’ state variable, therefore, production and profit that are based on
the state variable will change over time respectively. Production and profit are the key
components that lead to the stay or exit decision, and then the overall industry structure is
determined. In our model, decision makers are forward-looking agents. In the exit decision
process, they will compare the value of continuation to the benefit or loss of exit to see whether
to stay or not. The forward-looking property is driven by a dynamic setting. Bank’s size of loan
without additional cost is constrained by a capital threshold. This threshold can be understood as
for a given capital level, the bank cannot issue too many loans without additional cost. So the
additional regulatory cost term together with the threshold will provide an internal solution on
loan quantity.
We assume each bank will optimize profit conditional on current own state and the sum of the
state variable across the industry. This equilibrium definition is introduced by Weintraub,
Benkard, and Van Roy (2008) as “Oblivious Equilibrium” (henceforth OE)2, which is applied in
Markov perfect industry with many firms. In OE, each firm is assumed to make decision on own
state and the average industry state, and ignores current information on competitors. This method
can avoid solving a large number of simultaneous equations in each period as firms compete
2

Oblivious equilibrium concept is related to some past work: Hopenhayn (1992), Jovanovic and Rosenthal (1988),
Krusell and Smith (1998), Levine and Pesendorfer (1995), Fudenberg, Levine, and Pesendorfer (1998), and AlNajjar and Smorodinsky (2001).
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with each other. Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2008) proved that when there are a large
number of firms within the industry, OE closely approximates Markov Perfect Equilibrium. In
our example, in the panel data from 2000 to 2010, there are around 7000 incumbents per year.
Oblivious equilibrium will dramatically overcome the computation burden in this dynamic game.
The method used in estimation is Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007) two-stage estimation.
The intuition is straightforward. Ryan (2012) summarizes it as “the econometrician lets the
agents in the model solve the dynamic program’’ in the first stage, and “finds parameters of the
underlying model such that their behavior is optimal” in the second stage. More specifically, in
our model the static per period profit, reduced form policy function, and the stochastic process
law of motions for state variables are recovered in the first stage; in the second stage, the
dynamic exit scrap parameter is recovered by simulation for minimal violation.
In fact, the same question can be addressed in different countries. When exit decisions in
different countries are recovered, we can compare these underline primitives across counties.
The purpose of Basel is not to harmonize supervisory process in member and non-member
countries. Instead, it just provides guidelines and applicable approaches, which include on-site
inspections, off-site review, requirements for policy statements on risk management issues,
discussion with bank management, etc. Facing new financial environment and development in
the banking industry, Basel itself is continually updated. Therefore, it is rational to expect
different countries to have different exit policies. We focus our study on the U.S. given the
availability of data, the largest number of institutions in the banking industry in the world, and its
importance in the world financial system.

8

The remaining of the paper is as follows: Section 2.2 provides a brief description of the
industry. Section 2.3 presents the model. Section 2.4 presents the data used. Section 2.5 provides
the empirical strategy and estimation results. Section 2.6 concludes.

2.2 Description of the Industry
A bank, exchangeable with a firm in the paper, is a financial institution that accepts deposits
from fund suppliers and provides funds to demanders. This channel function between borrowing
and lending activities also classifies banks as one type of financial intermediary. There are two
main sources of banks profit: the spread the between interest rate on saving account provided to
fund supplier and the loan rate charged on fund demander; and transaction fees and financial
services revenues associated with many on-and-off-balance sheet activities. The fractional
reserve operation enables bank to hold only a small portion of the deposits and lend out the rest
for profit.
The banking industry in almost all countries is highly regulated based on this fractional
operation. At the same time, if a large portion of banks fails in a short period, it is a bad signal
for a country’s economical environment. In the U.S., there are three insured institution types:
insured branch of foreign bank, insured commercial bank, and insured savings institution. This
paper will analyze a panel set of the U.S. commercial banks from 2000 to 2010. Savings
institutions, including savings and loan association, or called thrift, and savings bank are not in
our sample. Thrifts, by law, can have no more than 20 percent of lending in commercial loans
during sample periods. Savings banks are primarily established for accepting saving deposits.
The establishment of thrift and savings bank is not totally the same as commercial bank. Besides
9

that, their chartering agency is the office of thrift supervision. While for national commercial
banks, the chartering agency is the Comptroller of the Currency.
Table 1 shows important financial data for the banking industry. For the structure of the
whole industry, the number of incumbents keeps decreasing from 1990 to 2010. Before the
financial crisis from 2007, industry total equity, total asset and total loan kept increasing. The
loan to asset ratio moves around 0.6 but never falls below one half.
The mean of loans to total assets ratio from 1990 to 2010 is 0.588, loans form the biggest
assets composition in the bank portfolio. Earnings from loans is one source of bank income; the
other source is from fee-based products, including on-and-off-balance sheet activities.
Diversification in these two types of operations has reduced risk. I separate bank income into two
types: net interest income (earnings on the spread between the loan rate and the interest rate) and
net noninterest income (on other alternatives). This setting up also follows the CALL report
format: total taxable income is the summation of net interest income and net noninterest income,
when banks provide their income statements. Examples of noninterest activities include interest
rate futures and forward contracts, interest rate written option contracts, foreign exchange
purchased option contracts, contracts on other commodities and equities futures and options,
standby Letters of Credit, etc. Most of these are off-balance sheet activities. Net noninterest
income is introduced as a mapping from the state variable equity. Having a structural form for
net interest income in the first step of profit function, and then adding net noninterest income in
the second step provides an attempt to make the model at least close to the real world, by
recognizing that loans are only a portion in the bank asset portfolio.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Important Financial Variables
Year

Equity

Loans

Assets

Loans/Assets
Number of
Ratio
Banks
1990
324448345
3140641709
5006872413
0.6273
12752
1991
330137163
2938151926
4874935180
0.6027
12320
1992
367047290
2833968645
4861213412
0.5830
11940
1993
404374848
2925757355
5021363721
0.5827
11525
1994
417456615
3132025081
5309072593
0.5899
11033
1995
457411631
3378140611
5595083638
0.6038
10505
1996
481367713
3576344223
5814707174
0.6151
10089
1997
521817218
3697187964
6215806450
0.5948
9667
1998
570685124
3977565052
6671204718
0.5962
9264
1999
582927219
4224784862
6926973874
0.6099
9063
2000
627694565
4510268770
7351128948
0.6135
8778
2001
700299508
4510207324
7578822559
0.5951
8540
2002
753076385
4728272159
8046061157
0.5877
8325
2003
786470639
4942340554
8459234210
0.5843
8197
2004
932873056
5282646693
9039258606
0.5844
8040
2005
960365275
5585919201
9355627577
0.5971
7921
2006
1043403028
5983646642
10061778096
0.5947
7793
2007
1120785037
6422872090
10800297123
0.5947
7666
2008
1105484472
6482713667
11606127804
0.5586
7456
2009
1221203182
6104305572
11058490958
0.5520
7214
2010
1260098399
6129613529
11153103672
0.5496
6898
Note: Column two to four present important bank financial variables from 1990-2010. Data reported are
the real value chained to 2005 GDP; unit is one thousand dollars. Column six presents the number of
banks from 1990-2010, which indicates the consolidation process in the U.S. banking industry.

Entry into the industry occurs when a firm obtains approval for the establishment, and a
charter is issued by the corresponding regulator. The banking industry is not a free entry industry
by this entering requirement. In 2010, the number of entrants was 9. In addition, looking at the
number of incumbents in the industry, exit apparently dominates entry. We assume that there is
only one entrant per period given the industry trend, and lack of a free entry condition to check
in computation.
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Exit in the banking industry is a little complicated. Once an incumbent bank becomes inactive,
there are two possibilities: real exit3 and merger exit. When banks no longer provides the CALL
report and disappear from the data, it does not necessary mean that they disappear from the “real
business.” If they are merged with other banks, in this case, they do not really leave. Others
could just recapture them, in that the acquirer would continue to operate the branch locations,
and exploit existing networks, etc. The acquirer files the merger report to the corresponding
regulators, and will become the new equity holder, once it is approved. This case is not a real
exit for my purposes. Real exit occurs when the firm no longer operates in the market. In our
paper, I focus on real exit. In terms of merger exit, TDeYoung (2009) provides a clear literature
review in the paper “mergers and acquisitions of financial institutions: a review of the post-2000
literature”, so I will not repeat them here. To my best knowledge, these references mentioned are
either in static setting, or in reduced form, which is just an approximation to try identifying
particular relationships between variables, instead of constructing the model that generates the
observed data. So reduced form analysis cannot handle policy experiments, which are considered
in my dissertation chapter two.
In this paper, I will address a dynamic model for the bank real exit problem. The merger
problem is not addressed here for two reasons. First, even if banks are merged under acquirers’
name, they may still continue in operation after consolidation. Second, in order to model merger,
I need assumptions on the timing and nature of the merger for computation. For example, the
largest bank decides to merger or not on value-maximization objective first; if it chooses not to
merger, the decision passes to the second largest bank, etc. However, in the real world, the

3

Real exit includes failed and closed exit in this paper.
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merger decision can arise from multiple motivations: manager’s self-serving4, or desire to get the
“too-big-to-fail” status 5 . Therefore, the merger policy should be a convolution of different
functions corresponding to each objective, and it is consistent with neither. Non-value
maximization motivations are easy to handle in reduced form analysis by just choosing
appropriate dependent and independent variables, but it is hard in a dynamic structural model.
The assumptions posed for model computation with merger might be inconsistent with the real
data, which makes the estimated primitives inconsistent.

2.3 Model
2.3.1 Sequence of Actions
Time is discrete and indexed by t  1, 2,3...... . The firm within the industry is indexed by
i  1, 2,3,...... . Firms discount the future at the rate   0.925 . In each period t , the state of bank
i can be described by a set of state variables: bank capital (or called equity) X it , industry level

loan rate faced in that time period irt , and total factor productivity in the net noninterest process

 it .  it includes all factors besides the state variable equity and loan rate, for example, human
capital, and more efficient computers in financial derivative pricing, etc. It maps equity to net
noninterest income, NNI it , which is the difference between noninterest income (including
income from fiduciary activities, venture capital revenues, and servicing fee, etc) and noninterest
expense (including salaries and employee benefits, and goodwill adjustment, etc). By introducing
this mapping, we can write
4

5

Bliss and Rosen (2001), Ryan (1999).
Shull and Hanweck (2001), Penas and Unal (2004).
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NNIit  it X it

(2.1)

We use notation Sit  ( X it ,it , irt ) to describe the set of state variables for bank i at time t ,

St  (S1t , S2t ,......, Snt )  {( X1t ,1t , irt ),( X 2t , 2t , irt ),......,( X nt , nt , irt )} is the industry state variable
as the collection of all banks at time t . A bank also has net interest income NII it from the spread
between the cost of funds and the revenue from funds. The summation of NII it and NNI it is used
as the corporation income tax base, after tax payment the net income attributed to a bank in that
period is NIAit . We choose notation  it to represent NIAit in the remaining of this paper,
because  it is the final per period profit earned, which is also consistent with the general
notation used in dynamic game papers.
At the beginning of each period, the incumbent provides loans Qit to earn net interest income

NII it on the spot market. The decision makers make exit decisions based on idiosyncratic scrap
parameter  , which is iid across firms and time. If a bank decides to exit, it  1 ; it will get
profit  it in that period and scrap value  X it , which is a portion of the owner’s equity depending
on the remaining term after liabilities are paid off. If a bank decides to stay, it gets profit  it and

it  0 . Then the bank state will evolve from X it to X i ,t 1 .
In each period, there is one entrant with charter into the industry. The entrant draws the initial
state from the empirical distribution of real entrants’ initial equity data. The preparation for entry
and exit takes one period. Then, incumbents with it  1 exit and new entrant enters the industry
to realize the decisions.

14

In the model, each decision period is one year. To put the timing of actions in order, it is as
follows:
1. Incumbents operate on loan market to maximize the interest profit over the size of loans
they provide, and operate on-and-off-balance sheet activities to earn noninterest income.
After corporate tax payment, they earn net profit.
2. Incumbents privately observe a scrap parameter to make the exit and stay decisions. If exit
happens, they take the period profit and the scrap value.
3. Entrant observes current industry state St  (S1t , S2t , S3t ......) and prepares for entering.
4. Exit and entry happen, industry state vector updates to St 1 .

2.3.2 Static Production
Banks obtain net interest income from lending and borrowing activities. The net interest
income of bank i in period t is:
X it
nt

 X jt

NII it  1 exp j1

irQ
t it   2 I (irt  irt 1 ) X it   3 I (Qit  TX it )(

Qit
 T )2 X it
X it

(2.2)

ir is loan rate, Q is amount of loans, X is equity (capital), I ( ) is the indicator function in this
paper, T is the threshold of loan to equity ratio at which cost binds.6 There are three parts of the
6

I built profit function on intuition of Ryan (2012), who studied cement industry with assumptions of constant
marginal cost, no fixed cost, and increasing variable cost as the “hockey stick” part to capture the idea when
production passed the capability constraint there will be corresponding additional cost. My equation to the banking
industry differs in the way that instead of constant marginal cost, I directly construct the earning-ratio of loans
revenues. This idea is driven by the fact that different banks may have different marginal cost given different
operation efficiency. Introducing the earning-ratio together with another term to capture the market power, can
provide different marginal revenue for each bank. Besides modification on modeling cost, there is another
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profit function introduced in order: the first term is the main loan earnings part, the second term
is revenue adjustment, and the last is cost adjustment. The spread between the deposit and the
loan rate is the main source of interest income. 1 is the coefficient representing the earning
spread ratio of fund. A bank’s competitive position is defined as the relative magnitude of own
state variable, X it to the industry state, which is modeled as exp( X it /

X

j 1:nt

jt

) . Larger bank

equity share represents more market power. By introducing the earning spread ratio, marginal
revenue depends on the market power exponential term; therefore, I can avoid the troublesome
constant marginal cost assumption in the banking industry.7 Maturity and interest rate of loans
are different case by case, and customers would pay their interest and loans based on the contract.
When the loan rate decreased, early issued long-term loans with a higher contract rate will
contribute some extra income to the bank if the loan revenue is computed with current low rate.
Suppose a 5-year loan is issued in 2000, it should pay interest on the contract rate at sign-up time
2000. If in 2003 the loan rate is lower than 2000, this loan will pay interest higher than the result
from computation with 2003 loan rate. This correction of loan return approximation is modeled
as the second term in equation (2.2). The fact of decreasing loan rate is the first indicator
function in equation (2.2). Loan is a decision variable in equation (2.2) depending on states.
Therefore, we directly map the extra revenue to equity X . This is an approximation to handle the
loan- maturity problem, and it is lag in order one in order to be consistent with the definition of
the Markov. The last term is the cost adjustment. Given fixed equity amount if a bank issues
more loans, the assets to equity ratio will increase. When loans to equity ratio passes a threshold

T , there is an additional regulatory cost. As loans pass the loan to equity threshold more in
adjustment term on revenue to approximate the real case that loans are issued with variance maturities in different
rates in my profit function.
7
Constant marginal cost may be a trouble assumption in the banking industry. D.C. Wheelock and P. W. Wilson
(2000) had construct Data Envelop Analysis on banks cost inefficiency.

16

magnitude, the additional marginal regulatory cost will arise. The third term in equation (2.2) can
be interpreted as an ongoing regulatory cost, depending on the loan issuance during bank
operation. 8 The last term in (2.2) gives a “hockey stick” shape cost function associated with
regulatory burden between loan and equity.9 To apply this shape of cost function is common in
industries, like electricity generation industry and cement industry, with increasing cost when
production is near maximum capability.10 To interpret application of this cost form intuitively in
the banking industry, loans are similar to production and threshold times equity is the maximum
capability. If a bank issues too many loans and passes a threshold, it means that the bank does
not have adequate capital for the risk it has exposed itself to through lending and investment
practices. When the bank reaches a certain threshold, it will suffer additional variable regulatory
costs,  3 is the cost parameter for the binding threshold on leveraged equity to loans. For
convenience, I approximate this non-linear ongoing regulatory cost as the square of the
magnitude of passing the threshold and mapping it directly to the state variable equity.
In the model, I impose the assumption that fixed costs are zero. Unless we can observe the
shutting down of operation in some period, the fixed costs cannot be identified. In our data
sample, we rarely can observe that. In the banking industry, fixed costs are not a fundamental
problem of interest. Banks do not hold many physical capitals because they do not have physical
production.

8

Gregory Elliehausen (1998) introduced regulatory cost consists of opportunity and operating cost that arise from
activities required by the regulation. More loans contribute a higher asset level, given the same amount of equity;
this higher leverage leads to non-linear increasing cost. The worst case is that when loan to equity ratio is high
enough to drive the assets to equity ratio to break the capital requirement, the bank needs capital injection before
reopen.
9
This specification is consistent with the Basel II requirement of additional regulatory scrutiny based on the ratio of
the volume of risk-weighted assets to equity as capital requirement. While this paper does not consider asset risk, the
model captures the relationship between the volume of lending activity and regulatory actions implied by Basel II.
10
Ryan (2012), “The Cost of Environmental Regulation in a Concentrated Industry”.
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Equation (2.2) defines the net interest income process for each bank from loan activities. In
the second step, we add net noninterest income and tax process. Thus per period payoff is:

 it  (1  tax) I ( NII it  NNI it  0) ( NII it  NNI it )  I ( NII it  NNI it  0) ( NII it  NNI it )
 (1  tax) I ( NII it  it X it  0) ( NII it  it X it )  I ( NII it  it X it  0) ( NII it  it X it )

(2.3)

Summation of net interest income and net noninterest income is the tax base. If it is a positive
number, banks need to pay the corporate income tax; otherwise, it is a net loss case, and there is
no tax payment.
From (2.3),  can be constructed as

it  I ( it  0)(

 it

1  tax

 NIIit )

1
1
 I ( it  0)( it  NIIit )
X it
X it

(2.4)

 it is total factor productivity in net noninterest process, which follows a unique AR(1) process
for each bank. This assumption indicates that each bank’s capability to earn net noninterest
income has its own pattern. 11 Interest income is relatively more standardized in operation;
therefore it follows a common function (2.2). However, net noninterest income is modeled quite
differently as a combination of many on-and-off balance sheet activities. We assume  follows
its own AR(1) process, and parameters can be estimated from bank level historical data. This can
be one reasonable way to handle the difficulties in the profit function given varieties of bank onand-off-balance sheet activities, while some of them are short term cleared and hard to capture in
an annual structural model analysis.

11

Assuming AR(1) process for state variable transition is common and standard in dynamic empirical Industrial
Organization papers: price state variable AR(1) process as in Ling Huang at al. (2011), Yizao Liu (2010); demand
state variable AR (1) process as in Myrto Kalouptsidi (2012).
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In fact, the process to get  from real data is very close to the macro paper’s treatment on
total factor productivity. After calibration of capital share and labor share in Cobb-Douglas
production function, we can compute total factor productivity. After the above process of
constructing the total factor productivity from the data, there are papers just assume an AR(1)
process12 as in (2.6), or add time trend in the AR(1) process13 as in (2.6.1).

2.3.3 Transition of States
The state vector St is composed of three variables X ,  and ir for all incumbents. X and 
are bank specific variables. ir is the industry level variable, following an exogenous growth
process as described in (2.5).
irt 1  c1  a1irt   t

(2.5)

Total factor productivity in noninterest income process  for each bank follows its own AR(1)
process as described in (2.6).

i ,t 1  ci2  ai2i ,t  i ,t

(2.6)

This process is only a function of itself. Total factor productivity excludes equity by definition,
and ir is for the interest income process. Therefore,  is independent of equity and interest rate.
Evolution on equity depends on lags of loan rate ir , total factor productivity in noninterest
income process  , and itself.

12
13

See Jos´e-V´ıctor R´ıos-Rull, Raul Santaeulalia-Llopis (2010) for detail.
See Paul Gomme and Peter Rupert (2007) for detail.
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X i ,t 1  ci3  ai3 X i ,t  bi3irt  di3i ,t  i ,t

(2.7)

Equity is an accumulation process. A higher last period loan interest rate and  can contribute to
a higher  . Excluding dividend payments, higher profit will lead to an accumulation of owner
equity.
When each bank has its own specific X and  processes, it could be true that some of these
processes are non-stationary: | ai2 | 1 or | ai3 | 1 in (2.6) and (2.7). To handle the possible nonstationary problem, we further extend (2.6) and (2.7) to be:

i ,t 1  ci2  ai2i ,t  bi2t  i ,t ,and i ,t 1  (2 | max(i ) |, 2 | max(i ) |)

(2.6.1)

i ,t 1  ci2  ai2i ,t  i ,t , and i ,t 1  (2 | max(i ) |, 2 | max(i ) |)

(2.6.2)

X i ,t 1  ci3  ai3 X i ,t  bi3irt  di3i ,t  ei3t  i ,t , and X i ,t 1  (2 | max( X i ) |, 2 | max( X i ) |)

(2.7.1)

X i ,t 1  ci3  ai3 X i ,t  bi3irt  di3i ,t  i ,t , and X i ,t 1 (2 | max( X i ) |, 2 | max( X i ) |)

(2.7.2)

(2.7.1) adds a time trend into the Law of Motion for equity X . We also put an upper bound and
a lower bound as double of the corresponding absolute value of maximum state variable we ever
observed in the historical data. Intuitively, the bound for the state variable indicates the fact that
regulators will not allow banks to behave ‘wildly’. Theoretically, it is consistent with the
equilibrium existence assumptions in Doraszelski and Satterthwaute (2010) that profits are
bounded. Profit is driven by state variables; therefore, we directly bound the state variables. This
assumption further modifies the equity transition with time trend to be equation (2.7.1). If it is
still non-stationary with time trend: | ai3 | 1 in (2.7.1). We will use (2.7.2). This treatment of nonstationary problem applies for  too, as listed in (2.6.1) and (2.6.2). The number of LOM
applied in each case is reported in the next section.
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We need the number of time series data to be no smaller than the number of coefficients to
identify the regression. So we use data from 1990-2010 to estimate all Laws of Motion. For the
case of not enough data for identification, we report those banks in a not enough data case, and
variable evolution in this case will be the mean value plus a random term.

2.3.4

Incumbent’s Problem

Each firm’s stay or exit strategy  i ( Si ,  i ) is a mapping from the state vector and shock to the
action decision:

 i : (St ,  i )  i

(2.8)

i  1 , it decides to exit; if i  0 , it decides to stay. In this paper, we use  i ( St ) to represent
the exit policy function of bank exit behavior as a function of the present state variables.
Give the knowledge of profit function, and state evolution, the incumbent’s Bellman equation
can be written as:
V ( X it ; i (St ),  i ,  ,  i )   ( X it ; i ,  )  E {max( X it , V ( X i ,t 1; i (St 1 ),  i ,t 1,  ,  i ))}

(2.9)

 i represents firm level private information about all state variable evolution and the scrap
parameter,  is the vector of payoff relevant parameters. If the incumbent exits, it can get a
portion of equity  X it plus profit. The exit decision is made based on the scrap value  X it and
the value of continuation, which equals
VC  E{V ( X i ,t 1; i (St 1 ),  i ,t 1,  ,  i )}
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(2.10)

2.3.5 Equilibrium Concept
Following Ericson and Pakes (1995), defining the value function V ( X ; X  ,  ,   ,  ) as the
expected discounted payoffs of a firm facing competitors X  playing strategy   . Markov
Perfect Equilibrium requires:
V ( X ; X  , ,  ,  )  V ( X ; X  , ,  ,  )

(2.11)

to hold for all alternative    .
However, MPE requires solving the problem based on the interactions between each
incumbent in each period. In the banking industry, there are around 7000 banks each year during
the sample period. It is infeasible and computationally intractable to apply this equilibrium
concept. Therefore, we define the value function and equilibrium definition in OE. With some
abuse of notation, the value function V ( X ; S ,  ,   ,  ) is the expected discounted payoffs of a
firm facing the industry level S , which is the summation of all bank equities X . OE requires:
V ( X ; S , ,  ,  )  V ( X ; S , ,  ,  )

(2.12)

to hold for all alternative    .
In the OE setting, each bank tracks the industry state every period, together with knowledge
on own state in order to make near optimal decision. Weintraub, Benkard and Van Roy (2008)
have proved that when the number of firms in an industry is large and a light-tail condition holds,
OE can closely approximate MPE.
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2.3.6 Estimation Strategy
The main problem for estimating a dynamic game is the computational burden. We use Bajari,
Benkard and Levin (2007) two stage estimation. The intuition of the BBL method is
straightforward. We recover as many static parameters as possible in the first stage, in this paper
they are profit function, exit policy function and laws of motion for the state variables. In the
second stage, the remaining structural parameter  is estimated using the optimality condition
for equilibrium. If  i is the optimal strategy for firm i , and   i denote competitors’ strategy,
equilibrium conditions requires (2.12) to hold. We use a simulation-based minimum distance
estimator method in the second stage. By adding disturbances to the policy function recovered in
the first stage, we search for the value of  which gives the minimum violation.
Doraszelski and Sattherthwaite (2010) have proved the existence of equilibrium in a close
related form. We will assume the existence of equilibrium.

2.4 Data
In the U.S., every national bank, state member and insured non-member bank is required to
file and submit a call report to the FDIC. After the FDIC collects, corrects, updates these files, it
puts these files onto a public information website. The first dataset used in this paper is the
CALL report. The CALL report contains a large set of bank financial data. Schedule RI contains
the income statement, Schedule RC collects the balance sheet, and Schedule RC-L includes
derivatives and off-balance sheet activities. We get all data used in our first stage estimation:
including total equity (RCFD G105 or the summation of RCFD 3000 and RCFD 3210), total
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asset (RCFD 2170), total loan (RCFD 2122), net interest income (RIAD 4074), net income
attributes to bank (RIAD 4340), from this dataset.
Loan rate may be different across loans. It is not feasible to allow interest to vary across loans.
Therefore, I use the mean value of prime loan rate from the FED and 30-year mortgage rate from
Freddie Mac as an approximation of loan rate.14
The second dataset used is the archive FDIC certificate number of insured commercial banks.
We separate commercial banks from other institutions like saving banks, which also need to
provide the CALL reports.
The last dataset is the Merger Decision Annual Report to Congress by the FDIC, which is
used to separate real exit and merger exit. Exit in the banking industry is a little complicated.
Unlike other industries, there are two types of exits. We cannot just pool all bank exits to define
as the real exit. The merger report provides applicant institution and target institution’s FDIC
certificate numbers, and action approved time. From the sample of banks that disappear from the
dataset, we pick out the merger cases, and the remaining exits are real exits. The merger decision
annual report to Congress is only available from 2000. This report separates mergers into four
categories: regular mergers, interim mergers, corporate reorganization mergers, and failed or
closed bank mergers. Table 2 provides a brief mergers statistic:

14

Real Estate loan is 56.33% of total loans from 2000 to 2010 in the banking industry, so we approximate 50% of
loan interest rate associated with mortgage interest rate and 50% associate with prime loan rate.
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Table 2: Summary Statistic for Mergers
Mergers

Number of Merger
Cases Reported

Number of Institutions
Merged

Number of Commercial
Banks Merged

Regular Mergers

1432

1141

860

Corporate
Reorganization Mergers

1163

1113

817

Interim Mergers

211

209

180

Failed or Closed Bank
191
190
161
Mergers
Note: The data source is the Merger Decision Annual Report to Congress by the FDIC from 2000-2010.

Some mergers take several steps in approval, for example: Citizens Bank, VIENNA, GA
has been merged 2 offices in 06/27/2000 and 3 offices in 9/18/2000. These were two cases
involving one institution. Therefore, the number of merger case reports is different from number
of institutions acquired. Merger reports also contains saving institutions and thrifts. We separate
the commercial bank from the merger report using the Archive FDIC certificate number of
insured commercial banks. The final data on commercial bank mergers is in the last column.
The number of real exit is 1433, which is similar in magnitude to total bank mergers in the
last column of Table 2, and so represents an important under studied question on bank
consolidation. We can do robust check by adding failed or closed bank mergers to the real exit
case, given the similarities between these two cases.
In order to get a better estimation for Laws of Motion for the state variables’ transitions, we
use data from 1990 to 2010. Other than recovering the state transitions, the data analysis is
conducted using the panel from 2000 to 2010.
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2.5 Empirical Estimation and Results
The goal of estimation is to recover model primitives: per period payoff, laws of motion for all
state variables, and exit scrap parameter  . After all model primitives are recovered, we can
conduct counterfactual experiments. The empirical estimation strategy is listed as follows:
1. Estimate the first stage net interest income profit function (2.2).
2. Use net interest income NII and bank’s per period payoff, net income attributes to bank  ,
according to equation (2.4) to construct  in the second stage of profit function.
3. Estimate state variables’ transition for each bank in (2.6) and (2.7), and industry level state
variable loan rate in (2.5).
4. Estimate real exit policy function.
5. Do forward simulation to estimate dynamic scrap parameter  .
Estimation results are reported in each following subsections.

2.5.1 Profit Function First Step: Net Interest Income
The first step profit function in the spread earnings from borrowing and lending activities
follows specification (2.2). NII is net interest income (RIAD4074). Loan rate is approximated
as the average value between business prime loan rate from the FED and 30-year mortgage rate
from Freddie Mac. Q is the size of loan (RCFD 2122). X is the equity (RCFD G105 or the
summation of RCFD 3000 and RCFD 3210). Even if we could observe all data, equation (2.2)
cannot be estimated directly by OLS. Loan volume is a decision variable that depends on the
state vector equity. OLS result will not be consistent. When the incumbent bank chooses loan
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quantity for profit optimization, we solve (2.2) to get the first order condition as the optimization
decision. The solution of loans is
X it

 X jt

  e j1:nt irt
 T ) X it , if Qit  TX it
Qit  ( 1
2 3

TX it ,
if Qit  TX it

(2.13)

Then plugging (2.13) into (2.2), we can rewrite (2.2) as
X it

NII it 



2
1

4 3

 X jt

I (Qit  TX it )(e j1:nt

X it

irt ) 2 X it  1e j1:nt

X it

 X jt

 1 I (Qit  TX it )(e j1:nt

 X jt

T X it irt   2 I (irt  irt 1 ) X it

X it

 X jt

irt ) 2 X it   2e j1:nt

T X it irt   3 I (irt  irt 1 ) X it

(2.14)

To estimate (2.14), we set T for a wide range of value from 1 to 20, and estimate by OLS for
each given T value. The estimation result is from regression given the minimum summation of
difference between real NII and estimated NII . Table 3 is the result for (2.14) and (2.2).
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Table 3: Profit Function Estimation Results

1

2
3

23.6065
(4.8181)***
0.4246
(0.0239)***
0.1191

1

0.4246

2

0.1191

3

0.0019

(0.0155)***
Threshold T

6.9
(0.2992) ***
Note: Number of observations = 82267. *** indicates significance at 0.01 level. Estimators are from
OLS result. Standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated by random sample with replacement with 5000
bootstraps.

The left panel reports parameters in (2.14), which are all significant at 0.01 level. R-square is
0.9234, which is a good overall fit. The results to transform coefficients in (2.14) to coefficients
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in (2.2) are on the right panel. There are two sources of bank heterogeneity in the net interest
income process. The first is the efficiency level in the earning spread ratio of funds, small banks
get near 1 , while larger banks gets more than 1 . 0.424620 on average seems a reasonable
value. Corbae and D’Erasmo (2011) provide cost of fund in terms of loan return. Their ratio (1cost of funds) is close to the earning spread ratio 1 in our estimation. In an extreme case that
one bank takes half of the market, 1 exp( X it /

X

j 1:nt

jt

) equals 0.7001. Under the market with

extremely high market concentration, this spread ratio seems to be still reasonable. In a more
normal case, if a bank takes one tenth of the market, 1 exp( X it /

X

j 1:nt

jt

) equals 0.4693.

Comparing to small banks with 0.4246, the difference is acceptable given the loans process is
standardized.
The second source of heterogeneity is the bank’s decision in each period concerning whether
regulatory threshold is binding or not. The threshold T here is different from the capital
requirement, which is the ratio between assets and equity, instead of loans. So T should be
smaller than the inverse of the capital requirement. When the total capital requirement ratio is
10%, the inverse is 10. Given the loan to asset ratio with mean value 0.588, a 6.9 threshold is a
reasonable value. The signs of the coefficients are all consistent with intuitive expectations.

2.5.2 Profit Function Second Step: Net Noninterest Income
Net noninterest income is the difference between noninterest income and noninterest expense.
Noninterest income activities include many on-and-off-balance sheet activities, which are
infeasible to be modeled by just simple persuasive equations. The idea behind the approximation
28

of NII   X is to build the model on the state variable, and the state variable can link both onand-off-balance sheet activities. When the bank operates with assets, parts of the assets are
devoted to the loan activity and majority of the remaining part is allocated to various on-and-offbalance sheet activities. The asset is a variable depending on the capital ratio and equity from
leveraged property in the banking industry. Loan volume is a decision variable depending on the
state variables too as described in the earlier section. Therefore, the asset allocated to noninterest
activities, as well as the income derived, can be introduced by as a link to the state variable
equity. The major part of noninterest expense is salaries and employee benefits, which depend on
asset size and finally leads expense term to link with equity.
In state vector St  {( X1t ,1t , irt ),( X 2t ,2t , irt ),......,( X nt ,nt , irt )} , X it and irt can be directly
observed,  it is calculated from equation (2.4) by observing  it , NIIit , X it and tax rate. The
corporation income tax brackets and tax rate is stable from 1993 to 2010. Rate for first $50,000
is 15%; $75,000-$75,000 is 25%; $75,000-$100,000 is 34%; $100,000-$335,000 is 39%;
$335,000-$10,000,000 is 34%; $10,000,000-$15,000,000 is 35%; $15,000,000-$18,333,333 is
38%; over $18,333,333 is 35%. The rates for taxable income brackets below $335,000 are the
same between 1988-1992 and 1993-2010. The only difference is from 1988-1992; the rate over
$335,000 is constant 34%. We use the mean values of 25%, 34%, 39%, 34% as an
approximation for the tax rate.
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2.5.3 State Transitions
The state vector St is composed of three variables X ,  , and ir . X and  are bank special
variables. ir is industry level variable, following AR(1) process as described in (2.5) .
Estimation result is in Table 4.
Table 4: State Transition for Interest Rate
Constant c1

0.0101
(0.0104)
1
0.8178
Lag interest rate a
(0.1805)
Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated on 500 bootstrapping samples.15

The loan interest rate shows high persistence, with a1  0.8178 at annual level. It is also
stationary as | a1 | 1 .
For firm level variables:  for each bank follows it own AR(1) process as exhibits in (2.6).
The process is only a function of itself, because bank’s capability in operation to transfer equity
to net noninterest income is an independent process from equity and loan rate. To handle the
non-stationary problem, we set an upper bound and a lower bound for each bank as described in
the early section. Banks can grow, but not infinitely.
Given the large number of banks, we will not report all coefficients, and just show the number
of banks belonging to each type in Table 5 and the graph for the coefficients distribution in
Figure 1.

15

See Appendix A.1. for bootstrapping detail in AR(1) process.
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Table 5:  Transition Summary
(2.6) Stationary
(2.6.1) Stationary with time trend
(2.6.2) Non-stationary
Not enough data

8112
193
437
707

Figure 1 shows the distribution of coefficient ai2 in (2.6.1) in the upper figure and (2.6) in the
bottom figure. The distributions are skewed. It has a heavy weight in the positive direction
indicating higher persistence. Equity evolution includes the returns from both interest income
activities and noninterest income activities, and last period stock value. Therefore, t 1 , irt 1 and

X t 1 enter into the equity Laws of Motion. The treatment of non-stationary process is the same
as  variable. Table 6 and Figure 2 reports the result.
Table 6: Equity State Transition Summary
(2.7) Stationary
(2.7.1) Stationary with time trend
(2.7.2) Non-stationary
Not enough data
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5957
2021
764
707

Figure 1:  Law of Motion
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Figure 2: Equity Law of Motion
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Figure 2 shows the distribution of coefficient ai3 in (2.7.1) in the upper figure and (2.7) in the
bottom figure. The distribution of equity is also skewed toward a high level of persistence.
Figure 3 is the comparison between distribution of theta processes that pools (2.6), (2.6.1)
together to be shown on the upper figure, and distribution of equity processes that pools (2.7),
(2.7.1) together to be shown on the bottom figure.
We can see the process of equity is more persistent than  . This is consistent with model state
transitions:  is only a process of itself, which may be more volatile; while equity is a process of
three variables in combination, and it shows higher persistence.

2.5.4

Exit Policy Function

As exit is the main feature of the model of banking industry evolution and it is not a free entry
industry, we assume there is only one entrant per period. The initial entry state variables are draw
from the entry distribution observed in the data. Therefore, the only policy we need to recover is
exit policy.
I characterize the probability of real exit using a Probit regression:

Pr ( it  1; X it  0, St )  ( 0   1 X i ,t   2  X j ,t   3 X i ,t  X j ,t )
j i

(2.15)

j i

The explanatory variables include own equity, competitors’ equity, and cross term of equities.
When a bank exits by merger, we will drop the remaining observations at the time of merger exit
from our regression as it is not a real exit case. There are 401 cases of merger and stay. We do
not have data to track partial mergers. At the same time, these banks do not meet the common
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definition of “stay” in the model. Therefore, we also drop these banks from regression after the
partial merger. After excluding all merger exits, we have a panel of 69976 bank-year
observations. The regression results are reported in Table 7.
Table 7: Exit Policy Result
Constant  0

-1.6799
(0.0486)***

Own Equity  1

4.1212E-07
(7.5508E-08)***

Competitors’ Equity  2

-4.1882E-10
(5.4325E-11)***

Own equity* Competitors’ Equity  3

-3.5614E-16
(7.9368E-17)***

Log Likelihood
-6958.05
Note: All merger cases are excludes from exit in this specification. Number of observation = 69976, ***
indicates significance at 0.01 level.16

All regressors are significant. The effect of own equity depends on the sign of  1   3  X j ,t .
j i

Competitor’s equity

X
j i

j ,t

for each bank at each time period is different. We evaluate the sign

of effect on own equity, and find that both  1   3 min( X j ,t )  0 , and  1   3 max( X j ,t )  0 .
j i

j i

Therefore, the effect of own equity with respect to the exit probability is negative. Banks with
low levels of capital are more likely to exit. For the effect of competitors’ equity, the sign of

 2   3 X i ,t is negative; but competitors’ equity effect is much smaller compared to own equity.

16

Robust report by treating failed or closed bank mergers as real exit is in Appendix A.2.
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Figure 3: Theta and Equity Law of Motion
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2.5.5 Dynamic Scrap Parameter: 
In the first stage, we have recovered the profit function, state transitions, and real exit policy
function. The remaining question is to find the dynamic scrap parameter  that will most closely
match the data we observe. We use the simulation-based minimum distance estimator proposed
by BBL.
The per period profit function after integrating out the private shocks is:

 i ( X t ; i (St ),  i ,  ,  )   i ( X t ; i ,  )   i (St )  X it

(2.16)

 ( S ) is real exit policy function.
To rewrite (2.16), we get

 i ( X t ; i (St ),  i ,  ,  )  [ i ( X t ; i ,  )  i ( St ) X it ] [1  ] '

(2.17)

Following BBL’s notation, 17we define


Wi ( X t ; i ( St ),  i ,  )  E i ( St )   t [ i ,t t '  i ( St t ' ) X it ]
'

(2.18)

t ' 0

Then the value function is:

Vi ( X t ; i (St ),  i ,  ,  )  Wi ( X t ; i (St ),  i ,  ) [1  ]'

(2.19)

The definition of equilibrium condition requires for all alternative policies  i , the following
inequality holds:
17

The estimation equation is built on Bajari et al. (2007). I differ from them in that they only assumed scrap value,
given the size distribution in the banking industry is skewed, I introduce the scrap value as the scrap parameter
multiply bank equity. Therefore, it is the portion of equity recoverable when exiting.
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Vi ( X t ; i ,  i ,  ,  )  Vi ( X t ;  i ,  i ,  ,  )
Wi ( X t ;  i ,  i ,  ) [1  ]'  Wi ( X t ;  i ,  i ,  ) [1  ]'

(2.20)

If there is any violation, we define the violation term as:

g ( X ,  )  Vi ( X t ;  i ,  i ,  ,  )  Vi ( X t ;  i ,  i ,  ,  )
 Wi ( X ; i ,  i ,  ) [1  ]'  Wi ( X ;  i ,  i ,  ) [1  ]'

(2.21)

To implement the estimation, we add a disturbance term to the Probit exit policy on the drawn
bank as the first term in (2.21), the second term is without disturbance term. The simulationbased minimum distance estimator method searches the parameter that gives the minimum
violation on equation (2.21). I use bootstrapping in  estimation. I draw 500 alternative policies
in each run, when g (S ,  )  0 , it is a violation. The objective function for the search is

min Q( ) 


1 n
 I ( g  0) g 2
n j 1

(2.22)

I repeat the run 1000 times. The standard error is estimated by random subsampling without
replacement as in Politis and Romano (1994). I randomly draw subsamples of 5000 complete
bank histories 20 times in each run.
I will provide some intuitive possible range of the dynamic scrap parameter before presenting
the results. Banks need to satisfy the simple accounting identity. A  L  X , A is asset, L is
liability, X is equity. Suppose now one bank operates with 10% capital ratio, and the risk-free
interest rate is 3% , then A  10 X , L  9 X . After one year, if the bank operates well, total assets
increases from A to 1.1A , equity will be 1.1*10 X  9 X *1.03  1.73X , which is a 73% increase in
equity that year, then it steps into next year. If the bank operates badly, there is a negative shock
to the total assets which cut it to 0.9A , in this case 0.9*10 A  9 X *1.03 . Bank assets is unable
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to cover the liability; if the bank exits, the FDIC deposit insurance will make up the difference.18
This is a net loss case. Decision makers may maintain the bank if the value of continuation can
cover the net loss. Therefore, we can give a reasonable initial guess of  : it is smaller than 1, and
could take on a small negative value. Table 8 reports the estimation result.
Table 8: Dynamic Parameter
Exit Scrap Parameter 

Mean
-0.4123

S.E.
0.2129

Leland and Toft (1996) has derived an equilibrium bankruptcy-triggering asset value by a
smooth-pasting condition. They found that for firms with long-term debt structure, the
endogenous bankruptcy-triggering asset value is typically less than the principal value of debt.
Therefore, the firm may continue to operate despite having negative net worth with limited
liability to debt holders. In fact, the equity is a call option on bank value; hence, there is option
value for bank equity. Harding, Liang and Ross (2009) had extended Leland’s model to the
banking industry with deposit insurance, and obtained a similar result.

2.6 Conclusion
This paper develops and estimates a dynamic structural model for the U.S. banking industry
evolution from 2000-2010. Banks issue loans to earn net interest income. Together with net
noninterest income, banks’ per period profit is constructed. Entry is an exogenous process given
the fact that the banking industry is not a free entry industry. The exit decision is endogenous and
18

It is not required for state-charter bank to have deposit insurance; now according to the data released by FDIC
almost all banks have deposit insurance.
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dynamic, as the decision makers are forward-looking. After exit scrap parameter is recovered, we
find that it is consistent with Leland and Toft’s (1996) finding that firms (banks in this paper)
will operate even with negative net worth.
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Appendix A:
A.1.
The panel is short in time, which leads to inaccurate computation of standard errors. We use a
parametric bootstrap as instead to get more accurate standard errors. The step proceeds as
follows:
Suppose we have a sample X t , t  1, 2,......, T from AR(1) process

X t  a0  a1 X t 1   t

(2.23)

1. Estimate the parameters aˆ0 , aˆ1 and the residuals ˆt .
2. Generate R bootstrap samples for X t for a long series using â0 and â1 , draw residuals
with replacement from ˆt .
3. Retain only the last T observations.
4. Refit the model using simulated data.
5. Compute standard error and confidence interval using R samples.

A.2.
Regulators can deal with the failed or closed bank in several ways. One way is the payoff
method. The other is the assumption method. Failed or closed exit by payoff, or being acquired
should follow the principle of which method yields the “minimum cost.” Overall, failed or closed
merger is a small portion of all mergers. Table 9 provides a robustness check by adding failed or
closed mergers to real exit.
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Table 9: Exit Policy Result (robustness check)
Constant  0

-1.8255
(0.0474)***

Own Equity  1

4.2808E-07
(7.5978E-08)***

Competitors’ Equity  2

-2.1449E-10

Own equity* Competitors’ Equity  3

(5.2117E-11)***
-3.7663E-16
(8.0078E-17)***

Log Likelihood

-7543.96
Note: Failed or closed bank merger is counted as exit case in this Probit exit policy function specification.
Number of observation = 70137, *** indicates significance at 0.01 level.

The dynamic scrap parameter under robustness check policy function is -0.4047, which stays
in the confidence interval.
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Chapter Two
Monte Carlo Experiments of Consolidation and Welfare
Impact

3.1 Introduction
Among structural models regarding the banking industry, Ackerberg and Gowrisankaran
(2006) analyzed banks’ adoption of the automated clearinghouse electronic payment system.
They separated banks into mutually exclusive networks, and a limited sample of banks in small
markets (national banks are excluded). Aguirregabiria, Clark, and Wang (2012) also introduced a
network model, which focused on Bank Expansion after the Riegle-Neal Act. Dick (2002) and
Zhou (2007) both introduced a market level analysis, by matching the observed bank market
share to the simulated bank market share in the model. With assumption of Type I extreme value
distribution on unobserved error term, these papers have a closed form solution for the market
share. So existing structural models either focus on bank expansion or market level analysis. This
dissertation is the first one to build a structural model to analyze banking industry consolidation,
driven by bank exit, at the firm level. Therefore, we can quantify the industry stay rate, given the
structural model is at the firm level; and industry producer surplus, given the profit function
setting in the model.
There are three principal findings. First, as the value of the continuation threshold becomes
sharper, the stay rate in the banking industry will decrease and the producer surplus will increase
corresponding to a more concentrated market. Second, negative shocks on the top banks are
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more significant for the whole industry in both scale and sensitivity. For the same level of
negative shocks, top 10 banks contributes to a decrease in producer surplus of at least $4537M
and the industry equity elasticity of producer surplus is 0.8504, 51 to 60 banks contributes the
decrease in the producer surplus by at least $1098M and the elasticity is only 0.5770. Finally, a
10% increase (decrease) on the earning spread between the loan rate and the deposit rate is
equivalent to a 2.2% decrease (a 2.8% increase) on the corporation tax rate.

3.2 Monte Carlo Experiments
The benefit of a structural model is once model primitives are recovered, we can construct
counterfactual experiments. We have placed structure on the profit function, which is required in
order to examine producer surplus and firm behavior in counterfactual experiments. Therefore, in
this paper we quantify the impact of regulatory environmental changes over different values of
the continuation threshold  on producer surplus and stay rate in the banking system. To achieve
this, we compute the equilibrium with different sets of parameters designed by corresponding
experiments.
The steps to compute the equilibrium are:
1. To start with an industry state St .
2. Update exit using recovered exit rule.
3. New entrant enters.
4. Update industry state using recovered state transition, entry and exit decisions to St 1 , get
the number of exitors, and then go back to 1.
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The equilibrium is reached when the number of exitors is not changing. All results are the
mean values of 500 runs, number of periods simulated is 200 years, and the initial starting
environment in all experiments is the U.S. banking industry structure in year 2000.

3.2.1 Value of Continuation Threshold
Decision makers compare the value of continuation and scrap value. When VCit   X it , bank
will stay to continue; otherwise, it will exit. The previous section estimated  in the second stage.
We take the recovered value as the benchmark, and construct other different sets of parameters

  0,1 . As  takes larger value, the exit pressure becomes tighter. I also compute industry
producer surplus and stay rate at three sets of  values.
Another setting to consider is whether the regulator allows loan volume to exceed the loan to
equity threshold as captured by the last cost adjustment term in equation (2.2), e.g. a loan volume
where the hockey stick regulatory costs apply. In model estimation, we observe the data on loan
volume, and we know whether it binds or not given the parameter. In the policy simulation,
however, we need to decide whether the regulatory threshold is binding or not. With the ability
to exceed the regulatory threshold, banks choose the quantity of loans for optimization, which
provides an interior solution based on facing the additional increasing regulatory cost term.
While for the binding case with the threshold acting as a cap, banks will choose a corner solution
leading up to the maximum level of loans allowed, e.g. up to the threshold. Therefore, we
consider two circumstances: the regulator allows all banks to exceed the threshold; or no bank is
allowed to exceed the threshold. We compute the stay rate and producer surplus in the model
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given a set of value of continuation threshold parameters under these two circumstances. Results
are reported in Table 10.
Table 10: Value of Continuation Counterfactual

Stay Rate
Producer Surplus



Q  TX
 0

 1

6.1.1
89.93%
1.2027E+09

6.1.2
73.69%
1.5488E+09

6.1.3
47.31%
1.8694E+09



Q  TX
 0

 1

6.1.4
6.1.5
6.1.6
Stay Rate
71.03%
53.52%
32.37%
Producer Surplus 3.8749E+08
6.5002E+08
1.0808E+09
Note: Stay rate equals (1-real exit rate), which is the exit excludes all merger cases. Both stay rate and
producer surplus are industry level variables for all tables in chapter two. The first column reports the
simulation results when   0.4123 as the benchmark model. The second column reports the
simulation results when there is no value of continuation. The third column reports the result when bank
equity owners can just recover their equity at the time of exiting.

The upper panel reports the results when all banks are allowed to pass the 6.9 loan to equity
threshold. As the value of the continuation threshold  becomes sharper from 6.1.1 to 6.1.3, it is
more difficult for incumbents to stay in the industry. Therefore, the industry becomes more
concentrated, and the industry producer surplus increases with market power due to the
concentration of industry. 6.1.1 to 6.1.3 for the upper panel represent results in order of  from
low to high, while loan volume is not controlled. This result also holds for the lower panel,
where loan volume is restricted. In each column of Table 10, the Q  TX environment will
provide a higher industry level producer surplus and stay rate, comparing to the Q  TX
sceneries. Controlling the loan size leads to a smaller per period profit, this will reduce the value
function and the value of continuation. Therefore, exit is more likely to happen, exit rate
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increases, and stay rate decreases. The stay rate wedge on whether loan volume is controlled or
not seems to decrease when facing higher  value. Under sharper regulatory environment, loan
control may become a less determinant factor for the stay or exit decision. Less competitive
banks under sharper regulation will leave anyway, which makes the wedge between stay rates for
the two circumstances to coverage. Ratios of producer surplus under 6.1.4 to 6.1.1, 6.1.5 to 6.1.2,
and 6.1.6 to 6.1.3 are 0.3221, 0.4197, and 0.5781 respectively. The ratio is increasing. This
indicates that the better competitive position exp( X i /  X ) in a more concentrated market,
which results from the higher  value and lower stay rate, would compensate the loss associated
with holding loans to the threshold in the operation.

3.2.2

Loan Control Policy

From 6.1.1 to 6.1.3, we have conducted experiments allowing all banks to pass the threshold;
and not allowing any bank to pass the threshold from 6.1.4 to 6.1.6. In this section, we design
another experiment that controls loan volume conditional on bank’s equity: the regulator only
allows the top 10 banks to pass the threshold. When we extend the loan size for one bank, assets
will increase, which is financed by debt in this model as equity evolution has its own process.
Therefore, the capital structure of that bank will change. The setting of this experiment is close to
the case of only allowing top banks to deleverage. It gives us an elementary analysis on how
different capital structures conditional on bank state will affect the whole industry.
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Table 11: Loan Control Counterfactual

 0


Stay Rate
Producer Surplus

6.2.1
6.2.2
71.81%
53.86%
7.4895E+08 1.0571E+09

 1
6.2.3
32.28%
1.4329E+09

The pattern of stay rate decreasing and producer surplus increasing with  is retained from
6.2.1 to 6.2.3. The stay rates do not change much, comparing 6.2.1 vs. 6.1.4, 6.2.2 vs. 6.1.5, and
6.2.3 vs. 6.1.6. The ratios of producer surplus under above two environments are 1.9328, 1.6263,
and 1.3258 respectively. When exit pressure is low, the ratio is high, and passing the loan
threshold contributes a lot to the industry producer surplus. When exit pressure is sharp, the ratio
is low, with overall low stay rate only relatively large banks can survive, and the resulting market
concentration dilute the effect of unfair competition on midsized banks. The remaining
experiments in this chapter assume Q  TX sceneries for simplification.

3.2.3 Shocks and Regulator Intervention
The purpose of this experiment is to explore the effect of negative shocks over the whole
industry. By comparing different negative shocks, we can deduce the importance of regulator
intervention during periods of financial instability. We first construct the following environments:
a 50% negative shock to top 10 banks each period on their equities. When this happens, there are
two options to choose from: first, to have capital injection, therefore the banks maintain the top
status in size; second, to adjust operation activities according to the new lower equity levels. In
our paper, we do not have the process of recapitalization; hence banks need to make adjustments
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on operations including loan size in net interest income process and equity based net noninterest
income process without government intervention. Results are reported in Table 12.
Table 12: Shock Counterfactual 1: top 1-10 banks

 0


Stay Rate
Producer Surplus

6.3.1
6.3.2
90.32%
80.81%
7.7099E+08 7.9839E+08

 1
6.3.3
47.23%
1.2398E+09

Comparing the results to 6.1.1-6.1.3, average stay rate for all banks is a little higher generally.
This result is by the fact that larger banks’ market power is decreased by negative shocks; hence,
small banks are more profitable in the income process and more likely to stay. Producer surplus
decreases by the negative shocks as the intuitive expectation.
Next, we assume there are same levels of negative shocks on rank 51 to 60 banks.
Table 13: Shock Counterfactual 2: 51-60 banks

 0


Stay Rate
Producer Surplus

6.3.4
6.3.5
90.61%
74.96%
1.0939E+09 1.4088E+09

 1
6.3.6
45.26%
1.8212E+09

The effect of negative shocks to the 51 to 60 banks is much smaller than top 10 banks in scale.
We also compute the industry equity elasticity of producer surplus in the benchmark model.
When the shocks are on top banks, the elasticity is 0.8504; while for the 51 to 60 banks, it is
0.5770. The impact with the shocks is substantially smaller when shocks are on the 50 to 60
banks, even after controlling for the scale of the experiment.
This experiment can explain the “too-big-to-fail” phenomenon. The social influence on big
banks’ failure will be much larger than small and medium banks in both scale and sensitivity. As
49

a regulator, the failure of larger banks is more than an industry issue. There is also a social
pressure to be more prudent. The small bank’s failure will not attract the same level of attention,
nor has the same impact on the market.

3.2.4 Interest Rate Control
Due to late 1970s high inflation rates, the price ceiling on interest rates has been removed to
allow commercial banks and saving institutions to compete with money market mutual funds. In
fact, the price ceiling on interest rate is an alternative way to control risk-taking behavior under
normal inflation circumstances. For example, Hellman, Murdock, Stiglitz (2000) proved that
large capital requirement can generate Pareto inefficient equilibrium, and they also find deposit
rate controls together with capital requirement can Pareto dominate regulation based only on a
capital requirement.
In this section, we design an experiment with regulation on the interest rate with a deposit
price ceiling. First, we assume the regulator has lowered the price ceiling on the saving interest
rate; therefore the earning spread ratio has increased by 10%. In the model, this design is
equivalent to increasing the recovered benchmark 1 by 10%, which is new1  1.11 .19 Then,
we assume that the regulator increases the price ceiling on the saving interest rate, earning spread
ratio decrease by 10%, which is new1  0.91 . The results are present in Table 14.

19

This experiment is also equal to increase the loan interest rate by 10%.

50

Table 14: Profit Spread Control Counterfactual

Stay Rate
Producer Surplus

Stay Rate
Producer Surplus



 0

 1

6.4.1
95.58%
1.3194E+09

6.4.2
82.41%
1.8354E+09

6.4.3
53.59%
2.2013E+09



 0

 1

6.4.4
83.65%
8.2045E+08

6.4.5
66.69%
1.1768E+09

6.4.6
38.44%
1.5744E+09

With a higher earning spread ratio experiments in the upper panel, banks can make more
profit, hence stay rate and producer surplus increase. For a lower earning spread ratio
experiments in the lower panel, both terms will decrease for all  values. These results are
intuitive. Then we compare the effects of the earning spread ratio changes to the change in
corporation tax rate. Table 15 reports the result.
Table 15: Calibration Result
newTax 
%old Tax
0.978
Stay Rate
Producer Surplus

Calibration Result
to 6.4.1
96.19%
1.3293E+09

newTax 
%old Tax
1.028

Calibration Result
to 6.4.6
82.94%
8.1936E+08

If there is an increase of 10% on the earning spread ratio, it is equivalent to a decrease in the
tax rate to 0.978 of the original value, which is a 2.2% decrease. If there is a decrease of 10% on
the earning spread ratio, it is equivalent to increase tax rate to 1.028 of the original value, which
is a 2.8% increase. To compensate for the change in the spread, the government can apply a
substantially smoother regulation in the corporation tax rate.
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3.3 Conclusion
After recovering all underlying model primitives in chapter one, we simulate the model to
calculate the expected industry stay rate and producer surplus in different environments. We find
that when banks face higher exit pressure as the scrap parameter becomes larger, industry stay
rate will decrease, and industry producer surplus increases due to a more concentrated market. If
there are negative shocks in the industry, both scale and sensitivity of the shocks are more
dramatic for top banks. As top banks are more important in status, it is consistent with the “toobig-to-fail” in the real word. If there are controls on the earning spread ratio, e.g. through the
deposit rate price ceiling, a 10% increase (decrease) in earning spread ratio is equivalent to
decrease (increase) tax rate by 2.2% (2.8%).
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Chapter Three
Identify Consolidation in Banking: Separating the Role of
Exits and Mergers

4.1 Introduction
We have observed a great consolidation in the U.S. banking industry over the last few decades.
In 2000, the number of commercial banks was 8778. While in 2010, the number was 6898. The
consolidation process in the banking industry takes the form of either exit by merger or exit by
failure or closure.
Merger in financial markets is more complicated than merger in other industries. According to
the Annual Merger Report to Congress by the FDIC, there are four types of mergers: regular
merger; interim merger; corporation reorganization merger; and the failed or closed bank merger.
Interim merger is a merger between an operating institution and a newly formed institution that
exists solely for the purpose of facilitating the merger. Therefore, there is no impact on
competition, and a report of competitive factors to the Department of Justice is not required.
Corporation reorganization merger is a merger between an institution and one or more of its
affiliates, and again the firm also does not need to report to the Department of Justice. Besides
the merger types, in the real world the merger decision may arise from multiple motivations:
manager’s self-serving, 20desire to obtain the “too-big-to-fail” status, 21or value maximization.22

20
21

See Bliss and Rosen (2001) for detail.
See Shull and Hanweck (2001), Penas and Unal (2004) for detail.
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Combining different merger types and various possible motivations, with the assumption of one
underlying merger primitive in a structural model is not creditable.23 In fact, a more reasonable
assumption on the merger underlying primitive is that merger policy function is a convolution of
the policy functions corresponding to different objectives, but it is consistent with neither. Given
the complexity of the banking industry, I examine the determinants of the various forms of bank
exit using a reduced form analysis in this paper.
The method used in this paper is to apply a reduced form competing risks survival analysis to
identify bank-level performances that might affect the possible action decisions. Each bank will
have one of the following possible actions according to their operation: exit by failure or closure,
exit by regular merger, exit by interim merger, exit by corporation reorganization merger, exit by
failed or closed merger, and stay. In this paper, I seek to identify bank characteristics that affect
these competing choices using an Extended Cox model. To my best knowledge, this paper is the
first one to separate the competing merger choices into a full set of possible outcomes.

22

Value maximization is the only appropriate objective function for a dynamic structural model formwork, Gautam
Gowrisankaran (1999) “A Dynamic Model of Endogenous Horizontal Mergers”.
23
In a dynamic structural model, it is very difficult to include the merger process. Usually, merger comes into the
model in the simulation section, instead of in the dynamic estimation. One example is Benkard, Bodoh-Creed and
John Lazarev’s working paper “Simulating the Dynamic Effects of Horizontal Mergers: U.S. Airlines”. After model
estimation, they do the merger simulation, for example if AA and UA merge what would be the response of the
post-merger airline market. Therefore, the model provides a good reference on the merger decision making process
for the Department of Justice. Another example is Zhou (2007) “Estimation of the Impact of Mergers in the Banking
Industry,” which estimates the utility function of consumers choosing certain banks. The back bone of this paper is
built on a discrete choice model to estimate market demand and supply, and analyze within-market merger in the
simulation process after recovering all parameters. In terms of dynamic estimation with merger in the model, to my
best knowledge, Gowrisankaran (1999) is the only paper developing a dynamic model of endogenous horizontal
mergers. The model imposes some important assumptions and design restrictions on the merger process. First, the
objective function in dynamic models with merger is the value function (or utility function). Second, the order for
the merger process is assumed that if one firm is on the merger list, the largest incumbent makes the decision first, if
the value function with merger is better than without merger, merger happens; otherwise, the merger decision passes
to the second largest incumbent, or possibly the third largest incumbent and so on. These rules make the dynamic
game tractable. However, this approach is very computational intensive, especially when there are many incumbents
in the model.
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To study bank consolidation, some of the empirical literature focuses only on the merger
problem. Hadlock at al. (1999) examine the effect of management incentives, corporate
governance, and performance on the likelihood that a bank is acquired on a sample of banks that
have at least $300 million in assets from 1982-1992. They find a negative relationship between
levels of management ownership and the likelihood to be acquired, and little evidence on other
incentives. Amel at al. (1989) include firm, market, and regulatory characteristics as covariates
to test the merger likelihood using data from 1978-1983. They find weak evidence that banks
with low profits and growth are more likely to be acquired. Hannan at al. (1987) use a
multinomial logit model to estimate the relationship between the likelihood of acquisition and
independent variables: return on asset, return on equity, relative return on asset, relative return on
equity, capital ratio, market share, market deposit growth, bank’s deposit growth, lag of bank
asset, loan to asset ratio, SMSA dummy, three-firm concentration ratio, and time fixed effect,
using a large sample of Texas banks from 1971 -1982. They find a positive relationship between
market share and the likelihood of being acquired, and negative relationship for capital ratio, and
for the SMSA dummy. There are no significant effects of profits and growth.
Besides studies on acquisition likelihood, there is another strand of the literature that conducts
reduced form analysis on improvements in operational efficiency (including cost efficiency and
profit efficiency) and accounting ratios pre- and post-merger.24 Additional papers focus on eventstudies of stock and bond market reaction after merger. 25 There are also event-study papers
regressed a set of independent variables, which includes the merger decision, against nonstockholder value maximization variables as dependent variables to identify other possible

24
25

See Akhigbe et al. (2004), Ashton JK at al. (2007), Berger at al. (1998).
See Houston et al. (1994) and (2001), Pilloff (1996).
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incentives for merger. 26 All these studies use merger as a covariant to examine the effect of
merger.
Another strand of empirical papers on bank consolidation studies bank failure only. Whalen
(1991) studies the relationship between important bank financial variables on the failure hazard
using data from 1987-1990. For all different versions of model specification, he finds that the
share of commercial real estate loans is always insignificant. Cole at al. (1995) estimate the same
relationship using a split-population model from 1986-1992. However, there is no clear
distinction between failure and merger in these papers. Thomson’s (1992) two-step model of the
closure decision extends the bank failure literature by explicitly separating economic insolvency
from the closure rule. Wheelock at al. (1995) estimated a hazard model only on failure for a
panel of Kansas banks, and merger in their paper is treated as censored.
In papers that examine both merger and failed or closed exit with a clear distinction between
these two types, Wheelock at al. (2000) studies this problem in a sample of banks with at least
$50 million of assets in 1984, and Robert DeYoung (2003) analyzes a smaller sample of 1664
new commercial banks chartered in the U.S. between 1980 and 1985.
In this paper, I introduce an Extended Cox model to identify the characteristics affecting bank
exit decisions first following Wheelock (2000) without separating different merger types to
check the robustness of the estimation results using a broad sample with all commercial banks in
the U.S. banking industry from 2000-2010. I further extend the model by breaking down the
competing risks into a full set of all possible exit decisions to correct estimation results. I also
include debt composition variables, as they are also important financial factors.

26

See Anderson C at al. (2004), Bliss at al. (2001), Hughes at al. (2003), Gupta at al. (2007) for example.
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I find that the well-capitalized banks are less likely to fall into failed or closed merger and
failed or closed exit, and that capital ratio is not important to strategic or developmental
associated mergers, such as regular merger and corporation reorganization merger. Asset
structure is important for all general exit decisions. Failed or closed merger and failed or closed
exit shares many similarities such as positive relationship on construction & land development
loans and subordinated debt to the corresponding risk, and negative relationship on capital ratio
and age to the corresponding risk. There is no robust result on the asset growth.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 4.2 introduces the methods used.
Section 4.3 presents data used. Section 4.4 presents estimation results without breaking down
merger types. Section 4.5 extends the model to include a full set of competing risks and provides
the estimation results. Section 4.6 concludes.

4.2 Methodology
The method I am using is a Competing Risks Extended Cox Model with time-dependent
covariates. Using x to represent time-dependent covariates, the cause-specific hazard rate,
which represents the risk of event j , is:

 j (t , x)  lim
dt 

Pr{t  T  t  dt , J  j | T  t , x}
dt

(4.1)

Pr{t  T  t  dt | T  t , x}
dt

(4.2)

The overall hazard is

 (t , x)  lim
dt 
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A bank that exits the market selects one leaving choice from the possible set of causes:
R = {regular merger; interim merger; corporation reorganization merger; failed or closed
merger; failed or closed exit}.
Therefore, we have
m

 (t , x)    j (t , x)

(4.3)

j 1

To construct the general form of the likelihood function, the cause-specific density of failure
is

Pr{t  T  t  dt | x}
dt
dt 
  j (t , x) S (t , x)

f j (t , x)  lim

(4.4)

The likelihood function for cause j is
n

L j   ji (ti , xi )di S (ti , xi )

(4.5)

i 1

Where i represents an observation in the risk set, d i is the indicator for i died of j .
The standard Cox model is

 (t | x)  0 (t ) exp( x'  )

(4.6)

Where 0 ( ) is the baseline hazard function. The Cox hazard model is a semi-parametric
model such that the focus of estimation is on the effect of change in the control variables on the
change in the hazard. The baseline hazard is not identifiable, and no additional assumptions are
58

required for estimation. According to the partial-likelihood method suggested by Cox (1975), we
can write the partial-likelihood function for competing risk as
m

exp( x ji '  j )

kj

L  
j 1 i 1



kR ( t ji

exp( x jk '  j )
)

(4.7)

Where k j is the number of death due to cause j , R(t ji ) is the risk set at time t ji . The partiallikelihood function is the joint function of all causes, and for each particular cause j , all other
causes of exit are treated as censored.

4.3 Data
The sample includes all commercial banks in the U.S. from 2000-2010. There are two main
sources of data used in this chapter. The primary source is the CALL report collected by the
FDIC. The other source is the Annual Merger Report to Congress again issued by the FDIC,
which is used to separate merger types and mergers from failed or closed exits.
In this paper, I first estimate models using a simple cause set of { acquisition, failed or closed
exit },which is the closest to Wheelock et al. (2000) in order to check the time robustness of the
results using data from 2000-2010 for comparison to earlier models. The empirical model
contains the covariates from the following information in bank operation to specify the
exponential term in equation (4.6) :
Capital structure: total equity/total assets.
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Assets composition: real estate loans/total assets, commercial & industry loans/total assets,
agricultural loans/total assets, loans to individuals/total assets, construction & land development
loans/total assets, and a lump sum residual assets variable defined as- other assets/total assets.
Debt composition: transaction deposits/total liabilities, time & saving deposits/total liabilities,
subordinated debt/total liabilities, and a lump sum residual liabilities variable defined asother liabilities/total liabilities.
Bank specific variables: bank age, log(total assets).
Earnings: net income/total assets.
Liquidity: (federal funds purchased – fed funds sold)/total asset.
In the bank financial report, debt composition variables mapping to total liabilities add up to
one, which also holds on asset composition variables. Therefore, for both bank level asset and
debt composition variables, the following identities hold:
n

m

 A  1, and  L
i 1

i

i 1

i

1

Where Ai and Li is each component in assets and liabilities respectively, and n  6 , m  4 by
the covariates construction in this paper. Recent papers have ignored the other assets and other
liabilities. However, the coefficients on the categories are meaningful only in comparison to the
omitted category. Effectively early papers estimate coefficients relative to these catchall
categories as the reference benchmarks. An alternative is to choose a more homogeneous and
relevant category as the benchmark. In this paper, I select real estate loans/total assets and time
& saving deposits/total liabilities as the omitted categories. Real estate loans and time & saving
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deposits are very standard in the operation and characteristic, which serve as better reference
variables.
The numbers of mergers are shown in Figure 4, and important volume variables are reported
in Table 16. It is obvious that regular merger and corporate reorganization merger are the two
main merger types. There are relatively few failed or closed bank mergers before the 2007
financial crisis. The principle the FDIC used in failed or closed bank mergers is the “minimum
cost approach”, which compares the cost of closing the bank to being taken over by an acquirer.
Usually the acquirer requires compensation from the FDIC for taking over the banks liabilities.
Interim merger has happened much less frequently, and there was no occurrence for commercial
banks in this type after 2008. There were only 34 cases for the interim merger in the sample
period, and given the number of covariates in the regression, the estimation result is not
meaningful. Hence, I withdraw this merger type from alternative competing risk set. So there is
no report on estimation results for this merger type.
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Figure 4: Bank Merger Cases from 2000-2010

Note: m1 is the number of regular merger case; m2 is the number of corporate reorganization merger case;
m3 is the number of interim merger case; m4 is the number of failed or closed bank merger case.

Table 16: Descriptive Statistics for Bank Merger Sample
Regular Merger
Corporate Reorganization Merger
Interim Merger
Failed or Closed Bank Merger

Total Assets
5.9811E+08
4.6396E+08
7.3877E+06
9.8169E+07

Mean
1.1614E+06
6.7732E+05
2.1729E+05
6.9624E+05

S.D.
1.0196E+07
4.2686E+06
1.9809E+05
3.2564E+06

Total Equity
Mean
S.D.
1.1734E+08
2.2785E+05
2.5325E+06
4.6890E+07
6.8452E+04
4.7246E+05
7.4256E+05
2.1840E+04
2.0688E+04
1.0210E+07
7.2414E+04
3.2734E+05
Note: All data are real value chained to 2005 GDP; unit is one thousand dollars. The upper panel for the
second and third column presents the means and standard deviations for total assets in the each merger
subsample. The lower panel for the second and third column presents the means and standard deviations
for the total equity in the each merger subsample in the same order.

Beyond the number of events, regular merger and corporate reorganization merger also
represent the largest volume of merger activities in terms of both total equity and total assets
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involved. Failed or closed bank mergers happen less frequently, but are an important type of
merger in terms of volume.
Descriptive statistics for independent variables are presented in Table 17. Commercial &
industry loans, agricultural loans, loans to individuals, construction & land development loans,
and subordinated debt have larger standard deviations relative to their mean values. Real estate
loans are the primary source of a bank’s asset portfolio, and this loan share exhibits much less
variation relative to other assets compositions. Time & saving deposits is the primary source in
bank’s debt structure in general, which also shows less variation than other components of debt
except transaction deposits.
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Table 17: Descriptive Statistics
Full Sample

Capital Ratio
Real Estate Loans/Total Assets
C&I Loans/Total Assets
Agricultural Loans/Total Assets
Loans to Individuals/Total Assets
Construction & Land
Development Loans/Total Assets
Other Assets/Total Assets
log(Assets)
Liquidity
Transaction Deposits/Total
Liabilities
Savings & Time Deposits/Total
Liabilities
Subordinated debt/Total Liabilities
Other Liabilities/Total Liabilities
Net Income/Total Assets
Age

Regular Merger

Corporation
Reorganization
Merger
Mean
S.D.

Failed or Closed
Bank Merger

Failed or Closed
Exit

Mean

S.D.

Mean

S.D.

Mean

S.D.

Mean

S.D.

0.1151
0.4157
0.0108
0.0481
0.0583

0.0807
0.1798
0.0414
0.0817
0.0746

0.1130
0.4096
0.0211
0.0381
0.0546

0.0803
0.1797
0.0576
0.0776
0.0617

0.1078
0.4518
0.0211
0.0425
0.0583

0.0582
0.1780
0.0562
0.0815
0.0691

0.1053
0.5539
0.0138
0.0201
0.0301

0.0806
0.1816
0.0560
0.0690
0.0388

0.1180
0.4262
0.0216
0.0263
0.0649

0.1337
0.1972
0.0613
0.0667
0.1060

0.0553

0.0744

0.0666

0.0877

0.0740

0.0888

0.1694

0.1517

0.0693

0.0921

0.4117
11.6903
-0.0068

0.2000
1.2626
0.0437

0.4101
11.8402
-0.0135

0.2183
1.6914
0.0585

0.3522
11.5732
-0.0088

0.2035
1.2169
0.0530

0.2127
11.9236
-0.0092

0.2601
1.2388
0.0500

0.3918
12.1442
-0.0103

0.2421
1.5784
0.0762

0.2497

0.1264

0.2439

0.1286

0.2401

0.1165

0.1831

0.1143

0.2173

0.1376

0.4807

0.3945

0.2914

0.3840

0.3035

0.3884

0.5036

0.4066

0.2947

0.3897

0.0005
0.2690
0.0083
63.7406

0.0047
0.4006
0.1007
44.4126

0.0010
0.4634
0.0072
54.1262

0.0048
0.3962
0.0651
43.8132

0.0004
0.4560
0.0079
57.3942

0.0041
0.3940
0.0127
42.3444

0.0004
0.3128
-0.0035
32.8369

0.0030
0.3834
0.0270
35.4775

0.0015
0.4863
0.0135
54.5541

0.0063
0.3976
0.3212
44.6867

# of observation
77358
2646
3466
1082
7097
Note: The first column presents the means and standard deviations for independent variables in the full sample including all commercial banks.
The second to five column presents means and standard deviations for the independent variables in each merger case subsample.
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4.4 Failed or Closed Bank Exit Hazard and Acquisition Hazard Estimation
Results
Wheelock and Wilson (2000) examine the hazard of bank exit due to either acquisition or
failure with at least $50 million of assets from 1984-1993. They find that banks with lower
capitalization, higher ratio of loans to asset, evidence of poor-quality loan portfolio, and lower
earnings are at greater risks of failure. Banks in states with branching permitted allowing for risk
diversification are also less likely to exit through failure. The results for the risk of acquisition in
terms of capitalization and earnings are consistent with the results for the risk of failure.
Branching opportunity increases the hazard for acquisition. The hazard for acquisition also
declines with cost inefficiency.
In this paper, in addition to the asset composition variables chosen, I also include debt
composition variables. The remaining of this section will first provide an intuitive expectation of
each covariate’s effect. Then I will report the results. Bank capital ratio is included in the
regression with the expectation of a negative correlation with the general hazard of exit. Capital
behaves as a cushion for the risk that banks face, so a higher capital ratio could represent a
positive signal for bank safety. I include the interaction term of capital ratio and bank size, as my
data set contains all commercial banks in the industry and so has much more size heterogeneity
than earlier studies. The same capital ratio may have different effects on large and small banks.
Large banks have more diversification in scale and scope of operation, which would more
actively reduce risk, and may prefer a different ratio of equity or debt financing given their risk
control processes. Loans are usually illiquid and risky given long maturities. Banks with a
relative higher portion of low risk loan type, for example agricultural loans, are more likely to
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stay, and vice visa. Debt has a higher priority than equity in repayment; therefore, debt usually
requires a lower rate of return than equity. In terms of debt compositions, it is reasonable to
expect that a relatively higher portion of stable debt has a negative effect on general hazard of
exit, and a relatively higher portion of risky debt such as subordinated debt has a positive effect.
A higher portion of transaction deposits to total liabilities is a good signal for more active
checking account business; therefore, it is likely to be negatively correlated with the general
hazard of exit. The coefficient on the earnings ratio should also be negative. Age, as an
approximation to a combination of unobservable variables, which could include accumulation of
human capital, training programs, and firm culture, etc, should also have a negative sign on exit.
I do not include state branch restrictions in the model, because interstate restrictions were
repealed by the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, which is
prior to my sample period 2000-2010.27 After the brief intuitive expectations of effects, Table 18
shows the regression results.

27

Wheelock and Wilson (2000) have introduced branching dummy, given their sample is from 1984-1993. Interstate
restriction was in the banking industry at that time.
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Table 18: Acquisition and Failed or Closed Exit Hazard
Acquisition Hazard

Capital Ratio
C&I Loans/Total Assets
Agricultural Loans/Total Assets
Loans to Individuals/Total Assets
Construction & Land Development
Loans/Total Assets
Other Assets/Total Assets
log(Assets)
Liquidity
Transaction Deposits/Total Liabilities
Subordinated debt/Total Liabilities
Other Liabilities/Total Liabilities
Net Income/Total Assets
Age
Capital Ratio*Log(Asset)
# of observation
# of events

Coef.
12.3300
0.1162
-1.2410
-2.3840
2.8770

P-value
0.0000
0.9036
0.0062
0.0001
0.0000

0.2750
0.0720
-0.5332
-1.3120
13.8200
-0.3343
-0.8694
-0.0016
-1.4810

0.1893
0.0438
0.3725
0.0004
0.0000
0.3339
0.0023
0.0228
0.0000

77358
1374

***
**
***
***

*
***
***
**
*
***

Failed or Closed Exit
Hazard

Coef.
3.0270
0.3400
-3.0220
-0.0195
1.2810

P-value
0.0598
0.6470
0.0000
0.9494
0.0108

0.3636
0.2159
-0.6130
-1.4500
4.7570
0.3289
0.0241
-0.0020
-0.2446

0.0632
0.0000
0.1859
0.0000
0.0070
0.2074
0.9083
0.0028
0.1083

77358
1433

.
***
*
.
***
***
**

**

Failed or Closed Exit
Hazard

Failed or Closed Exit
Hazard

Failed or Closed Exit
Hazard

lag1 Capital Ratio
Coef.
P-value
9.0950
0.0000 ***
0.5641
0.4465
-3.1130
0.0000 ***
0.1949
0.5279
1.5360
0.0025 **

lag2 Capital Ratio
Coef.
P-value
9.0930
0.0000 ***
0.6513
0.3835
-3.1790
0.0000 ***
0.1960
0.5270
1.6450
0.0014 **

lag3 Capital Ratio
Coef.
P-value
9.6330
0.0000 ***
0.8067
0.2941
-3.3360
0.0000 ***
0.1262
0.6897
1.5400
0.0034 **

0.5529
0.2646
-1.1360
-1.7170
6.1790
0.2096
-0.0145
-0.0025
-0.8900
76060
1417

0.0046
< 2e-16
0.0168
0.0000
0.0003
0.4517
0.9422
0.0002
0.0000

**
***
*
***
***

***
***

0.6114
0.2572
-1.2030
-1.7950
4.9840
0.1547
-0.0048
-0.0030
-0.8673
74578
1399

0.0018
< 2e-16
0.0126
0.0000
0.0021
0.5816
0.9740
0.0000
0.0000

**
***
*
***
**

***
***

0.6016
0.2517
-0.9717
-1.8600
4.6280
0.1679
0.0007
-0.0034
-0.9312

0.0023
< 2e-16
0.0562
0.0000
0.0036
0.5556
0.9953
0.0000
0.0000

**
***
.
***
**

***
***

72976
1372

Note: The first column reports the regression estimators, p-value, and significance result without separating merger types. The second column
presents the result for failed or closed exit. The third column presents the results using lag 1 period capital ratio to replace current capital ratio to
handle endogeneity between capital ratio and the failed or closed exit hazard. The third column presents the results using lag 2 period capital ratio
to replace current capital ratio to handle endogeneity between capital ratio and the failed or closed exit hazard. The third column presents the
results using lag 3 period capital ratio to replace current capital ratio to handle endogeneity between capital ratio and the failed or closed exit
hazard. indicates significance at 0.1 level; *indicates significance at 0.05 level; **indicates significance at 0.01 level; ***indicates significance at
0.001 level.
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4.4.1 Time to Acquisition
Besides commercial & industry loans/total assets, liquidity, and control variables such as
other assets/total assets and other liabilities/total liabilities, all other covariates are significant.
The insignificance of commercial & industry loans/total assets is consistent with Wheelock at al.
(2000). In fact, federal funds as an approximation for liquidity do not provide much information;
the insignificance might be due to the poor approximation.
The effect of capital ratio is significant, and the effect depends on the sign of
12.3300 1.4680log(asset ) . I evaluate it at the mean value 12.1800 1.4680 11.6903  4.9814 ,

which is negative as expected. On average, higher capital ratio reduces the acquisition hazard.
The magnitude of this effect also depends on bank assets; it is more economically significant for
large banks than small banks. For the same level of capital ratio improvement, the acquisition
hazard for large banks decreases more relative to small banks.
Three out of the four assets composition covariates are significant. 28 Shares of agricultural
loans and individual loans have negative effects on the acquisition hazard using real estate loans
as reference. A bank’s agricultural loans and individual loans are less risky than real estate loans
to lead to the acquisition decision. The agriculture industry is usually relatively stable due to
subsidies from government in many countries including the U.S. 29 On the other hand; real estate
loans usually have the longest maturity, which is associated with more uncertainty. Therefore,
acquirer may be less likely to take over banks with a higher level of uncertainty in its asset
portfolio if it has other options. While the share of construction & land development loans is the
28

Other assets/total assets is interpretable as a control variable. Therefore, I do not take it into asset composition
covariates count.
29
The United State pays to farmers in direct subsidies as “farm income stabilization” in the following commodities:
feed grain (mostly corn), upland cotton, wheat, rice, soybean, dairy, peanuts, sugar, minor oilseeds, tobacco, wool
and mohair, vegetable oil products, honey, and other crops.
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most risky loan type in asset portfolio, it has a positive effect on the acquisition hazard. To order
the preference of asset composition that leads to the acquisition decision: the first tier is
construction & land development loans, the second tier is real estate loans, and the last tier is
agricultural loans and individual loans.
The effect on control variable log(asset ) depends on the sign of 0.0720 1.4610  capital ratio ,
which is a negative value even given the minimum capital requirement as 10%. Asset growth,
which happens when log(asset ) is increasing, reduces the acquisition hazard. Given the same
asset growth rate, acquisition is less likely to happen for banks with a higher capital ratio.
All debt composition covariates are significant. 30 It is not surprising to have the same
expected effects on transaction deposits and subordinated debt. To order the preference of debt
composition that leads to the acquisition decision: the first tier is subordinated debt, the second
tier is time & saving deposits, and the last tier is transaction deposits. Earnings ratio is negatively
correlated to the acquisition hazard. Higher earnings lead the acquisition risk to decrease by a
good income stream in bank profitability performance. Age, as an approximation of a collection
of bank level unmeasurable variables is significantly negative related to the acquisition hazard as
expected.

4.4.2 Time to Failed or Closed Bank Exit
Some covariates have the same effects on both time to acquisition hazard and time to failed or
closed exit hazard. For example, the negative relationship to failed or closed exit hazard on
agricultural loans, transaction deposits, and age; and positive relationship on construction & land
30

Other liabilities/total liabilities is interpretable as a control variable. Therefore, I do not take it into debt
composition covariates count.
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development loans and subordinated debt. The preference follows the same order as in
acquisition hazard results.
The cross term of capital ratio and log(asset ) is not significant. Therefore, it is not reliable to
derive effects on capital ratio and log(asset ) in this model specification. Current capital ratio is a
potentially endogenous variable to the current exit decision, which might lead to the reported
insignificant estimation result in the second column in Table 18. To handle this endogeneity, I
further run the same model by replacing capital ratio with its values from a one-year to threeyear lag, and present the results in column 3-5 in Table 18. In lag capital ratio model
specifications, capital ratios with different lag period are all significantly negative, which
indicates higher capital ratio history reduces the future failed or closed exit hazard on average.
The effects on log(asset ) in all three lagged capital ratio models are positive, which contradicts
the result for the acquisition hazard. Hence, I do not observe a consistent effect of asset growth
on the general hazard of exit. Only capital ratio or lag value of capital ratio is consistently
negatively correlated with the general hazard of exit.
Failed or closed exit hazard is more consistently affected by the debt composition variables;
all of them are highly significant. 31 In terms of asset composition, agriculture loans and
construction & land development loans are significant. The cluster of impacts on the debt side
and equity ratio to the failed or closed bank exit may be a signal that the bank’s evolution of
corporate financing is more important to failed or closed exit risk. Especially, since at the same
time only two variables out of four in asset composition is significant together with insignificant
net income. Beyond debt side variables, longer age reduces the hazard of failed or closed exit,
which is the same as in the acquisition case.
31

Other liabilities/total liabilities is treated as control variable.
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4.5

Competing Risks within Acquisition Hazard Estimation Results

The Annual Merger Report to Congress can further extend the acquisition decision into four
categories according to the classification. Therefore, given the availability of data, I will break
the acquisition hazard into each subset of competing risks. The estimates for failed or closed exit
hazard result will not change, as the estimation routine treat other cause-specific events as
censored. Therefore, breaking down the acquisition into specific categories will not affect the
failed or closed exit hazard results.
The purpose of this section is to compare the effects of bank-level variables on the risk of
various types of acquisition. It is obvious that regular mergers and failed or closed mergers are
very different given the motivation and regulatory process. To treat the combination of these two
events as one event may produce noisy estimates because the numbers of these two events are
different and the weight in estimation may drive the results closer to the event that is more
frequent. The estimates will be improved in the model with a complete competing risks choice
set. The regression result is reported in Table 19. 32

32

I do not report the estimators for the interim mergers due to model specification. There are only 34 events in this
type of merger and there are 14 parameters to estimate. Therefore, interim mergers are treated as being from
truncated.
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Table 19: Merger Hazards
Regular Merger Hazard
Capital Ratio
C&I Loans/Total Assets
Agricultural Loans/Total Assets
Loans to Individuals/Total Assets
Construction & Land Development Loans/Total Assets
Other Assets/Total Assets
log(Assets)
Liquidity
Transaction Deposits/Total Liabilities
Subordinated debt/Total Liabilities
Other Liabilities/Total Liabilities
Net Income/Total Assets
Age
Capital Ratio*Log(Asset)
# of observation
# of events

Corporation
Reorganization Merger
Hazard

Failed or Closed Bank
Merger

Coef.

P-value

Coef.

P-value

Coef.

P-value

3.5482
1.1805
-1.7644
-3.3695
2.4723
1.0721
0.1006
-0.6641
-0.2916
5.9510
0.3020
0.0639
-0.0014
-0.5056

0.3067
0.4206
0.0252
0.0014
0.0033
0.0010
0.0578
0.4549
0.5958
0.2182
0.5334
0.7809
0.2128
0.1463

-1.8540
-1.0960
-1.3490
-1.6990
0.6790
-0.8073
-0.1504
0.0841
-1.1260
7.5080
-0.2928
0.1004
-0.0001
0.1522

0.3861
0.4181
0.0206
0.0162
0.3259
0.0074
0.0004
0.9264
0.0382
0.0047
0.5578
0.6351
0.8877
0.5116

64.1100
7.2850
1.5010
-4.4120
4.1160
-0.7690
0.2310
-3.8810
-7.5490
-14.9200
-3.1910
-2.3570
-0.0056
-8.2200

< 2e-16
0.0066
0.3411
0.1573
0.0011
0.2517
0.0296
0.1970
0.0000
0.4629
0.0050
0.0164
0.0372
< 2e-16

77358
514

*
**
**
***
.

77358
685

*
*
**
***
*
**

***
**

**
*
***
**
*
*
***

77358
141

Note: The first column reports the regression estimators, p-value, and significance result for regular merger subsample. The second column reports
the regression estimators, p-value, and significance result for corporation reorganization merger subsample. The third column reports the
regression estimators, p-value, and significance result for failed or closed bank merger subsample. indicates significance at 0.1 level; *indicates
significance at 0.05 level; **indicates significance at 0.01 level; ***indicates significance at 0.001 level.
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I focus on capital ratio and log(asset ) impacts first. In regular merger and corporation
reorganization merger, capital ratio and log(asset ) are both insignificant. In the real world, these
two mergers are more related to the firm’s strategic development. Therefore, acquirers might not
be interested in bank at a bad capital cushion status, which is in an instantaneous risk of getting
warning notice from regulators that requires capital injection. However, for failed or closed bank
mergers capital ratio is important. To evaluate the effects on this merger type at the mean value:
64.1100  8.2200  log(asset )  31.9841  0
0.2310  8.2200  Capital Ratio  0.7143  0

Better capital position, which provides adequate buffer, is likely to reduce the hazard for
failed or closed mergers. The negative effect on log(asset ) indicates that banks with assets on
negative growth path are more likely to be acquired through failed or closed mergers. Combining
all effects on capital ratio, it only has a negative effect on failed or closed decisions, which
includes both failed or closed merger and failed or closed exit. There is no robust conclusion on
the effect of log(asset ) .
As the regular merger associates more with strategic development, an unhealthy bank is hard
to enter into the acquirer’s choice set, given the possible high cost involved in the merger process.
Only acquiree’s asset composition attracts attention. Construction & land development loans
rank higher in preference comparing to real estate loans, agricultural loans and loans to
individuals rank the last to the associated risk. The insignificance in commercial & industry
loans still holds as formal results. The debt structure for the regular merger decision is not
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important. Results in Table 18 suggest that formal significance in debt composition variables in
acquisition hazard regression in section 4.4.1 are driven by failed or closed bank mergers.
Corporation reorganization merger is a special case, which only happens between parent and
affiliate institutions. If an affiliate bank has capital inadequacy problem, the parent bank would
not like to take it over given limited liability in this firm organizational structure. Instead of a
pure strategic development, this type of merger is more close to reorganization in its
characteristic. Therefore, parent banks take both asset and debt composition variables into the
decision process. Results on agriculture loans and loans to individuals show higher contributions
than real estate loans, which is usually in long maturity and hard to adjust thereafter, to keep
away from being merged by parent firm. Active transaction deposits are preferred than savings &
time deposits, and subordinated debt if affiliate institutions want to stay in the industry.
Failed or closed merger shares more commonalities with failed or closed exit. Therefore, the
effects of covariates follow almost the same pattern as failed or closed exit reported in Table 18.
Asset and debt composition, capital ratio, and age all affect the decision. The impact of
construction & land development loans is consistent in both failed or closed merger and failed or
closed exit. However, in failed or closed merger, commercial & industry loans increase the
corresponding likelihood; while in failed or closed exit, agricultural loans decrease the
corresponding likelihood. The deviation of asset factor in failed or closed merger and exit may
relate to bank location problem. In commercial and business active areas, usually there is
financial institutions cluster effect. If failure or closure happens, it is easier to find a potential
interested acquirer to take over the banks comparing to less developed rural areas, which gives
the significance of commercial & industry loans in failed or closed merger, and the significance
of agricultural loans in failed or closed exit.
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4.6 Conclusion
The U.S. banking industry from 2000-2010 is stable in terms of regulation. Interstate
restriction was repealed for seven years before 2000. The market became more concentrated with
bank consolidation during the sample period. In this paper, I try to identify the bank
characteristics that lead to the consolidation using a complete set of possible competing risks in
order to provide a better understanding of merger process.
A well-capitalized bank is less likely to experience both failed or closed bank merger and
failed or closed bank exit. Capitalization is not important for more strategic or developmental
associated mergers, such as regular mergers and corporation reorganization mergers. Asset
structure is important for all general exit decisions. Regular mergers focus only on the asset
composition, agricultural loans, and loans to individual are negatively correlated to the regular
merger hazard, and construction & land development loans is positive. Corporation
reorganization mergers depend on both asset and debt structure. More agricultural loans, loans to
individual, and transaction deposits reduce the risk; higher subordinated debt increases the risk.
Failed or closed mergers and failed or closed exits share many similarities. There are positive
relationship to construction & land development loans and subordinated debt, and negative
relationship to capital ratio, transaction deposits, and age. The deviation of the effects between
commercial & industry loans and agricultural loans in failed or closed mergers and exits may be
a location problem. There is no robust result on the asset growth.
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